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I.

INTRODUCTION

The strides made to ensure equality, discourage discrimination, and end violence based
on sexual orientation and gender identity have been remarkable.1 States have employed various
legal and statutory mechanisms to achieve these goals.2 Since 2011, three states have abolished
criminal sanctions for homosexuality; fourteen have adopted or strengthened anti-discrimination
laws by extending legal protections to included sexual orientation and gender identity; twelve
have legally recognized same-sex marriage or civil unions; and ten have made it easier for
transgender persons to obtain legal recognition of their gender identity.3 Many countries are
going beyond legal attempts to end violence and discrimination based on sexual orientation and
gender identity by implementing sensitivity training for police, judges, medical staff, and
teachers as well as anti-bullying programs in schools.4
While these advances are certainly noteworthy, unspeakable human rights violations
continue to occur against individuals based on their sexual orientation and gender identity around
the world.5 In Houston, Texas, a proposed ordinance that called for the end of discrimination on
the basis of sexual orientation, race, age, and other categories was defeated due to a successful
fear mongering campaign against transgender citizens.6 Extremist groups such as the Islamic

1

United Nations Office of the High Commissioner for Human Rights, Discrimination and Violence
Against Individuals Based on Their Sexual Orientation and Gender Identity, A/HRC/29/23, 3 (4 May
2015) http://www.un.org/en/ga/search/view_doc.asp?symbol=A/HRC/29/23&referer=/english/&Lang=E.
2
Throughout this article, ‘states’ and ‘countries’ will be used interchangeably.
3
Id.
4
Id.
5
Id.
6
Id.
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State (ISIS) have thrown men accused of homosexuality off of tall buildings, shot them, and
stoned them to death in Iraq, Syria, and Libya.7
Despite not necessarily graining as much attention as physical acts of violence, legislative
and judicial means of discrimination can be just as damning. In Malaysia, the federal court
reversed a ruling that held a Sharia provision that forbids “a male person posing as a women” to
be unconstitutional, resulting in the reinstatement of policies that permit arbitrary detention of
trans women.8 Finally, Kyrgyzstan, Kazakhstan, and Belarus have all proposed legislation that
imposes penalties for providing objective or positive information about homosexuality.9 Despite
the tremendous advances in the protection from discrimination and violence based on sexual
orientation and gender identity, these aforementioned examples of continuous and increasingly
egregious human rights violations serve as justification for the argument that more concerted and
cooperative steps need to be taken.
This paper addresses the central question of whether the protections afforded under the
Convention on the Elimination of all forms of Discrimination Against Women (CEDAW) can or
should be extended to members of the lesbian, gay, bisexual, and transgender (LGBT)
community.10 Section II examines what it means to be a member of the LGBT community and
the respective protections that are currently afforded under international law. Section III explores
the Feminist Paradox and the application of this theory to the LGBT community. Section IV
7

Graeme Reid, Equality to Brutality: Global Trends in LGBT Rights, WORLD ECONOMIC FORUM, Jan. 7,
2016, https://www.weforum.org/agenda/2016/01/equality-to-brutality-global-trends-in-lgbt-rights/.
8
Id.
9
Id
10
There is an ongoing discussion about the appropriate acronym to encompass the entirety of “the gay
community”. Throughout this article, I will be using LGBT for the sake of simplicity, but that should not
be taken as an attempt to exclude those that identify as pansexual, asexual, gender nonconforming,
nonbinary, genderqueer, gender fluid, gender neutral, or intersex. For definitions of all of these terms, see
Michael Gold, The ABCs of the L.G.B.T.Q.I.A. +, N.Y. TIMES (June 21, 2018), https://www.nytimes.com/
2018/06/21/style/lgbtq-gender-language.html.
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evaluates CEDAW and its’ applicability to LGBT persons. Lastly, Section V analyzes the merit
of options for protection under CEDAW.
II.

LGBT COMMUNITY
A. Definitions

The first step in advocating for the rights of a particular population is to define the
population. Two central components necessary to understanding membership in the LGBT
community are ‘sex’ and ‘gender’. The World Health Organization defines sex as, “the
biological characteristics that define humans as female or male.”11 Gender is defined as, “the
socially constructed characteristics of women and men- such as norms, roles and relationships of
and between groups on men and women.”12 Despite the fact that sex and gender are often used
interchangeably, it is clear that the terms have distinctive definitions and any legal mechanism
hoping to protect people based on their gender or sex should include definitions of both.
Although the concept of gender identity has become a mainstream topic in recent years,
historically, the idea that someone could identify as a different gender than which their biological
sex indicates has not always been accepted.13 Gender identity is generally understood to “reflect
a deeply felt and experienced sense of one’s own gender.”14 Gender identity can be expressed in

11

Sexual and Reproductive Health: Defining Sexual Health, WORLD HEALTH ORGANIZATION,
https://www.who.int/reproductivehealth/topics/sexual_health/sh_definitions/en/ (last visited Nov. 10,
2017).
12
Gender, Equality and Human Rights, WORLD HEALTH ORGANIZATION, http://www.who.int/genderequity-rights/understanding/gender-definition/en/ (last visited Nov. 10, 2017).
13
Darren Rosenblum, Unsex CEDAW, or What’s Wrong with Women’s Rights, 20(2) COLUMBIA J.
GENDER & L. 98, 125 (2011).
14
Ending Violence and Other Human Rights Violations Based on Sexual Orientation and Gender
Identity: A Joint Dialogue of the African Commission on Human and Peoples’ Right, Inter-American
Commission on Human Rights and United Nations, Pretoria University Law Press, p.1 (2016),
http://www.ohchr.org/Documents/Issues/Discrimination/Endingviolence_ACHPR_IACHR_UN_SOGI_d
ialogue_EN.pdf.
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a variety of ways including the way one dresses, speaks, or embodies certain mannerisms.
Although gender identity usually corresponds with sex, that alignment is not universal.15
The concept of gender identity is most closely related to transgender and intersex
persons. As a point of comparison, someone whose gender identity matches the sex they were
assigned at birth is considered ‘cis’ or ‘cisgender’.16 Transgender, or trans, is an umbrella term
used to describe a wide range of identities – including transsexual people, cross-dressers
(sometimes referred to as ‘transvestites’), people who identify as third gender, and others whose
appearance and characteristics do not correspond with the sex they were assigned at birth and/or
are perceived as gender atypical.17 On the other hand, someone who is intersex was born with
“the sexual anatomy, reproductive organs, and/or chromosome patterns that do not fit the typical
definition of male or female.”18 The assumptions that sex is synonymous with gender or that sex
is dichotomous inhibits our ability to ensure equal rights for all people because those whose
sexual identities differ from their gender identities can be excluded or forgotten easily.
In addition to gender identity, sexual orientation is another common term that is not often
thought to need definitive clarification. Sexual orientation “refers to a person’s physical,
romantic, and/or emotional attraction towards other people.”19 There are several terms under the
umbrella of sexual orientation. The term ‘gay’ is generally used to describe men who are
attracted to men, but it can also be used to describe women who are attracted to women.20 The

15

Id.
Michael Gold, The ABCs of L.G.B.T.Q.I.A.+, N.Y. TIMES (June 21, 2018), https://www.nytimes.com/
2018/06/21/style/lgbtq-gender-language.html.
17
Id. at 2.
18
Id.
19
Id.
20
U.N. High Commissioner for Refugees, Guidelines on International Protection No. 9: Claims to
Refugee Status based on Sexual Orientation and/or Gender Identity within the context of Article 1A(2) of
16
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term ‘lesbian’ defines women who are attracted to women.21 Those who are attracted to both
men and women are considered ‘bisexual.’22 The term ‘bisexual’ is often thought to mean that a
person is equally attracted simultaneously to both men and women, but it can also mean
exclusive attraction to one gender at one time and attraction to a different gender at a different
time, or varying levels of attraction for different genders.23 The failure to include the respective
terms that express the various forms of sexual orientation can lead to a failure for members to be
correctly included within the LGBT population.
B. Population Determination Challenges
Determining exact statistics on the number of people who identify as a member of the
LGBT community is difficult for a variety of reasons. First, the definition of who is included
within that community varies from country to country.24 Next, the lack of standardized survey
methods, such as self-reporting or multiple-choice questions, can skew the results.25 Finally,
population identity problems are compounded, as most countries’ censuses do not inquire about
sexual orientation or gender identity.26 Illegality of homosexuality in some countries and
powerful negative social stigma that in some cases has resulted in violence may also keep people
from openly divulging their sexual orientation or gender identity even in countries where the

the 1951 Convention and/or its 1967 Protocol relating to the Status of Refugees, ¶ 10, U.N. Doc.
HCR/GIP/12/09 (Oct. 23, 2012), available at http://www.unhcr.org/50ae466f9.pdf.
21
Id.
22
Id.
23
Id.
24
Gary J. Gates, How Many People are Lesbian, Gay, Bisexual, and Transgender, THE WILLIAMS
INSTITUTE (2011) https://williamsinstitute.law.ucla.edu/wp-content/uploads/Gates-How-Many-PeopleLGBT-Apr-2011.pdf.
25
Id.
26
Counting the LGBT Population: 6% of Europeans Identify as LGBT, DALIA RESEARCH (Oct. 18 2016)
https://daliaresearch.com/counting-the-lgbt-population-6-of-europeans-identify-as-lgbt/.
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census enquires.27 These circumstance culminate in incomplete and inaccurate estimates of the
number of individuals who identify as LGBT.
Despite these limitations, LGBT population data is still being gathered. One study
estimated that 5.9% of Europeans identify as LGBT.28 However, this study was not immune to
data collection difficulties. For example, it produced wildly different results of sexuality based
on the type of question asked.29 When asked to answer in terms of ‘yes’, ‘no’, or ‘prefer not to
say’ to the question ‘do you identify as lesbian, gay, bisexual, or transgender?’, 5.9% of people
answered affirmatively.30 In contrast, when asked “which of the following options bests
describes your current sexual orientation” with answers of “only heterosexual”, “mostly
heterosexual, sometimes homosexual”, “equally heterosexual and homosexual”, “mostly
homosexual, sometimes heterosexual”, “only homosexual,” or “asexual”, 10% of participants
choose options other than “only heterosexual”.31 It should be noted that the difference in
percentages from this particular study is especially significant because respondents were asked to
answer both questions at the same time as opposed to being asked of different sample sets or of
the same group but at different times.32
In contrast, studies from the United States, Canada, the United Kingdom, Australia, and
Norway estimated that anywhere from 1.2% to 5.6% of respondents identify as lesbian, gay, or

27

For example, the death penalty is a possible punishment for homosexuality in Mauritania, Sudan,
northern Nigeria and southern Somalia. Mapping Anti-Gay Laws in Africa, AMNESTY INTERNATIONAL
UK: LGBTI RIGHTS (Feb. 16 2017), https://www.amnesty.org.uk/lgbti-lgbt-gay-human-rights-law-africauganda-kenya-nigeria-cameroon.
28
DALIA RESEARCH, supra note 24.
29
Id.
30
Id.
31
Id.
32
Id.
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bisexual.33 It would be a mistake to interpret the dearth of readily available LGBT population
data as evidence that members of the LGBT community comprise a statistically insignificant
portion of the global population. This erroneous assumption would make it easy to assume that
specialized protections are unnecessary, despite the fact that members of the LGBT community
are at risk for some of the most egregious human rights violations.
C. Sources of Legal and Statutory Protection
As of 2017, there is not an international mechanism dedicated to the protection of the
LGBT community.34 However, the core human rights treaties do in fact, or at least in theory,
protect the rights of those that identify as LGBT by being framed in the terms of “all people”.
Although there is a lack of legally binding, LBGT specific mechanisms, there are several sources
of soft-law directed at protecting this community’s human rights. Additionally, there are
numerous general comments to the core human rights treaties that address the LGBT community
specifically, albeit superficially.35 This section will explore the sources of protections for the
LGBT community and the specific rights enumerated within those sources.

33

Gates, supra note 22, at 3.
Aengus Carroll & Lucas Ramon Mendos, State Sponsored Homophobia: A World Survey of Sexual
Orientation Laws, ILGA, p. 13 (May 2017), http://ilga.org/downloads/2017/ILGA_State_Sponsored
_Homophobia_2017_WEB.pdf.
35
U.N. Econ. & Soc. Council, General comment No. 20: Non-discrimination in economic, social and
cultural rights (art. 2, para. 2, of the International Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights),
U.N. Doc E/C. 12/GC/20 (July 2, 2009), available at https://www.refworld.org/docid/4a60961f2.html;
U.N. Convention on the Rights of the Child, General comment No. 13 (2011): The right of the child to
freedom from all forms of violence, U.N. Doc CRC/C/GC/13 (April 18, 2011), available at
https://www.refworld.org/docid/4e6da4922.html; U.N. Committee Against Torture (CAT), General
Comment No. 2: Implementation of Article 2 by States Parties, U.N. Doc CAT/C/GC/2 (Jan. 24, 2008),
available at https://www.refworld.org/docid/47ac78ce2.html; U.N. Committee on the Elimination of
Discrimination Against Women (CEDAW), General recommendation No. 27 on older women and
protection of their human rights, U.N. Doc CEDAW/C/GC/27 (Dec. 16, 2010), available at
https://www.refworld.org/docid/4ed3528b2.html; U.N. CEDAW, General Recommendation No. 28 on the
Core Obligations of State Parties under Article 2 of the Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of
Discrimination Against Women, U.N. Doc CEDAW/C/GC/28 (Oct. 19, 2010), available at
https://www2.ohchr.org/english/bodies/cedaw/docs/CEDAW-C-2010-47-GC2.pdf; U.N. High
34
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i) International Bill of Rights
International Bill of Human Rights, which is comprised of the Universal Declaration of
Human Rights (UDHR), together with the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights
(ICCPR) and the International Covenant on Economic, Social, and Cultural Rights (ICESC)36 all
include lists of prohibited grounds of discrimination in their non-discrimination guarantees.37
These lists do not explicitly include “sexual orientation” or “gender identity”, but they all
conclude with the words “other status.”38 The concepts of universality, equality, and nondiscrimination lie at the core of international human rights law treaties.39
The UDHR was adopted by the United Nations General Assembly on December 10,
1948.40 The Declaration set out to define a set of protections fundamental to all humans.41 Article
1 of the UDHR states that, “[a]ll human beings are born free and equal in dignity and rights.”42

Commissioner for Refugees, Guidelines on International Protection No. 9: Claims to Refugee Status
based on Sexual Orientation and/or Gender Identity within the context of Article 1A(2) of the 1951
Convention and/or its 1967 Protocol relating to the Status of Refugees, U.N. Doc HCR/GIP/12/09 (Oct.
23, 2012), available at https://www.unhcr.org/50ae466f9.pdf
36
Fact Sheet No.2 (Rev.1): The International Bill of Human Rights, Office of the High Commissioner of
Human Rights, http://www.ohchr.org/Documents/Publications/FactSheet2Rev.1en.pdf.
37
G.A. Res. 217 (III) A, Universal Declaration of Human Rights (Dec. 10, 1948), available at
http://www.un.org/en/ga/search/view_doc.asp?symbol=A/RES/217(III); International Covenant on
Economic, Social and Cultural Rights, Dec. 16, 1966, 993 U.N.T.S. 3, available at
https://www.ohchr.org/EN/ProfessionalInterest/Pages/CESCR.aspx; International Covenant on Civil and
Political Rights, Dec. 16, 1966, 999 U.N.T.S. 171, available at https://www.ohchr.org/EN/
ProfessionalInterest/Pages/CCPR.aspx.
38
United Nations Office of the High Commissioner for Human Rights, Born Free and Equal: Sexual
Orientation and Gender Identity in International Human Rights Law, HR/PUB/12/06, p. 41,
http://www.ohchr.org/Documents/Publications/BornFreeAndEqualLowRes.pdf.
39
U.N. High Commissioner for Human Rights, Discrimination and Violence Against Individuals Based
on Their Sexual Orientation and Gender Identity, U.N. Doc. A/HRC/29/23 (4 May 2015), available at
http://www.un.org/en/ga/search/view_doc.asp?symbol=A/HRC/29/23&referer=/english/&Lang=E.
40
G.A. Res. 217 (III) A, Universal Declaration of Human Rights (Dec. 10, 1948), available at
http://www.un.org/en/universal-declaration-human-rights/.
41
Id.
42
Id., at Art. 1
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Article 3 states that, “everyone has the right to life, liberty and security of person.”43 Members of
the LGBT community are not specifically protected nor are they specifically excluded from the
protections afforded by the UDHR. The UDRH has been in existence for over half a decade, yet,
the rights of the LGBT community are still far from being protected as compared to the nonLGBT population.
The International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights (ICCPR) was adopted and
opened for signature on December 16, 1966 by the United Nations General Assembly and
entered into force on March 23, 1976.44 “The ICCPR obligates countries that have ratified the
treaty to protect and preserve basic human rights, such as: the right to life and human dignity;
equality before the law; freedom of speech, assembly, and association; religious freedom and
privacy; freedom from torture, ill-treatment, and arbitrary detention; gender equality; the right to
a fair trial; and minority rights.”45 State parties that have signed onto the treaty obligate
themselves to protecting the rights included in the treaty though administrative, legal, and
judicial means.46 As with the UDHR, the ICCPR addresses the protection of human rights
generally.47
Finally, the International Covenant on Economic, Social, and Cultural Rights (ICESC)
was adopted by the United National General Assembly in 1966.48 Like the UDHR and the

43

Id.
International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, Dec. 16, 1966, S. Treaty Doc. No. 95-20, 6 I.L.M.
368 (1967) http://www.ohchr.org/EN/ProfessionalInterest/Pages/CESCR.aspx.
45
FAQ: The Covenant on Civil & Political Rights (ICCPR), ACLU, https://www.aclu.org/
other/faq-covenant-civil-political-rights-iccpr, (last updated Apr. 2014).
46
Id.
47
Id.
48
International Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights, Dec. 16, 1966, S. Treaty Doc. No. 9519, 6 I.L.M. 360 (1967) http://www.ohchr.org/EN/ProfessionalInterest/Pages/CCPR.aspx.
44

9

Kellie Bruney
ICCPR, the ICESC addresses human rights in terms of ‘all people’.49 Article 1 of the Covenant is
especially important because it specifically states, “all peoples have the right of selfdetermination.”50 Additionally, no State, group or person has the right to engage in activities
aimed at destructing any of the rights enumerated in the Covenant. Each component of the
International Bill of Human Rights provides general protections for all citizens but lacks specific
designations for the LGBT community.51
ii) Soft Law
The concept of soft law is challenging for law students and legal scholars alike because
soft law is not actually law at all.52 Soft law usually refers to any written international
instrument, other than a treaty or convention, containing principles, norms, standards, or other
statements of expected behavior.53 Soft law “expresses a preference and not an obligation that
state should act, or refrain from acting, in a specific manner.”54 While not legally binding,
different forms of soft law can be very powerful in informing expectations.
However, soft law is more than just political or policy statements.55 In November 2006,
twenty-nine experts from twenty-five different countries met in Yogyakarta, Indonesia to discuss
the current obligations of state parties to ensure the protection of LGBT rights under

49

Id.
Id. at Art. 1.
51
Id. at Art. 6(a).
52
Andrew Guzman and Timothy Meyer, International Soft Law, 2 J. LEGAL ANALYSIS 171, 172 (2010)
https://scholarship.law.berkeley.edu/cgi/viewcontent.cgi?referer=https://www.google.com/&httpsredir=1
&article=1694&context=facpubs.
53
Dinah L Shelton, Soft Law, GWU. L. SCH. PUB. L. AND LEGAL THEORY WORKING PAPER No. 322, 3
(2008) https://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=1003387.
54
Joseph Gold, INTERPRETATION: THE IMF AND INTERNATIONAL LAW 331 (1996).
55
Id.
50
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international law.56 Following a unanimous vote, nineteen principles and sixteen additional
recommendations were set out “affirming binding international legal standards with which all
States must comply” with respect to sexual orientation and gender identity.57 Named the
Yogyakarta Principles, this documents details various LGBT rights that range from the right to
the universal enjoyment of human rights58 to the right to a fair trial.59 Though the Principles
themselves are not binding on State Parties, they do affirm demands already laid out in the core
human rights treaties.
While there is still a continuous debate about the binding nature of United Nations
resolutions and decisions, they still carry weight as formal expressions of the opinion or will of
UN organs.60 The Human Rights Council has adopted three resolutions specific to sexual
orientation and gender identity.61 The first adopted resolution was Resolution 17/19 enacted in
2011.62 In recognition of the protections afforded by the UDHR and the call to action contained
in General Assembly Resolution 60.251 of 2006, the Human Rights Council requested that the
UN High Commissioner for Human Rights commission a study of discriminatory laws and

56

The Yogyakarta Principles: Principle on the Application of International Human Rights Law in
Relation to Sexual Orientation and Gender Identity (Mar. 2007), available at http://data.unaids.org/
pub/manual/2007/070517_yogyakarta_principles_en.pdf.
57
Id.
58
Id. at 10.
59
Id. at 15-16.
60
Are UN Resolutions Binding, DAG HAMMARSKJOLD LIBRARY, (Jan. 9, 2017), http://ask.un.org/faq/
15010.
61
United Nations Human Rights Council, Human Rights Resolution: Human Rights, Sexual Orientation
and Gender Identity, A/HRC/RES/17/19 (June 17, 2011); United Nations Human Rights Council, Human
Rights Council Resolution: Human Rights, Sexual Orientation and Gender Identity, A/HRC/RES/27/32
(Sept. 26, 2014); United Nations Human Rights Council, Protection Against Violence and Discrimination
Based on Sexual Orientation and Gender Identity, A/HRC/RES/32/2 (June 30, 2016)
http://www.ohchr.org/EN/Issues/Discrimination/Pages/LGBTUNResolutions.aspx.
62
U.N. Human Rights Council, Human Rights Resolution: Human Rights, Sexual Orientation and Gender
Identity, A/HRC/RES/17/19 (June 17, 2011), https://documentsddsny.un.org/doc/UNDOC/
GEN/G11/148/76/PDF/G1114876.pdf?OpenElement.
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practices based on sexual orientation or gender identity.63 Although Resolution 17/19 does not
call for direct action by member states to the UN to ensure the protection of LGBT rights, the
UN’s recognition of vulnerability based on sexual orientation and gender identity by the Human
Rights Council was monumental.
The second resolution adopted, Resolution 27/32, was enacted in 2014.64 Resolution
27/32 was written based on the acknowledgment and appreciation of United Nations High
Commissioner for Human Right’s report pursuant to Resolution 17/19.65 Resolution 27/32
requested that the High Commissioner update the report, paying special attention to
recommending best practices for eliminating discrimination based on sexual orientation and
gender identity.66
Finally, Resolution 32/2 was enacted in 2016 and was an important step in ensuring the
elimination of discrimination against members of the LGBT community.67 Resolution 32/2 calls
for several actions: it appoints an Independent Expert on protection against violence and
discrimination based on sexual orientation and gender identity; calls upon all States to cooperate
with the Independent Expert; and requests that the Expert submit annual reports back to the High
Rights Council.68 Again, acknowledging the limitations and debate regarding the binding nature
of resolutions, these three resolutions serve as evidence that the Human Rights Council not only

63

Id.
U.N. Human Rights Council, Human Rights Resolution: Human Rights, Sexual Orientation, and
Gender Identity, A/HRC/27/L.27/Rev.1 (24 Sept. 2014) https://documents-dds-ny.un.org/doc/UNDOC/
LTD/G14/171/09/PDF/G1417109.pdf?OpenElement.
65
Id.
66
Id.
67
U.N. Human Rights Council, Human Rights Resolution: Protection Against Violence and
Discrimination Based on Sexual Orientation and Gender Identity, A/HRC/32/L.2/Rev.1 (28 June 2016)
https://documents-dds-ny.un.org/doc/UNDOC/LTD/G16/135/00/PDF/G1613500.pdf?OpenElement.
68
Id.
64
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recognizes the problem of discrimination based on sexual orientation and gender identity but is
also taking steps to eradicate it.
Currently, legally binding international human rights law provides theoretical protections
for members of the LGBT community grounded in the concept of basic humanity. Soft law has
gone much further in specifying the unique struggles of LGBT persons and urging states to
eliminate discrimination and bias based on gender identify and sexual preference. The progress
in LGBT legal and statutory protections is undeniable. Yet, the lack of specific, legally binding
obligations to ensure the equal rights for differently sexed or gendered individuals leaves too
much room for discrimination.
III.

Edward’s Feminist Paradox as applied to the LGBT community

In her seminal book Violence Against Women Under International Human Rights Law,
Alice Edwards introduced the idea of the feminist paradox.69 Edwards endeavored to explain
why women experience obstacles to equal treatment and proposed solutions to that problem. She
explained that, “the more that women’s specific concerns of violence are raised in human rights
institutions, the more women become reduced to essences and are marginalized.”70 Accordingly,
women have two choices when it comes to realizing equal rights. Women can either equate their
experiences to harm normally perpetrated against men or justify why their experiences deserve
an exception to the rule.71 Just as women as a group experience inequality as a result of an
immutable characteristic, so do members of the LGBT community.
By extension, it is a reasonable inference that, parallel to the struggle for women’s
protections, members of the LGBT community must either equate their experiences to those

69

Alice Edwards, VIOLENCE AGAINST WOMEN UNDER INTERNATIONAl HUMAN RIGHTS LAW, 4 (2010).
Id.
71
Id.
70
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experienced by gender and sex conforming individuals or justify why they deserve specialized
protections. This section will explore the advantages and disadvantages of equation and
justification as mechanisms to ensure equality and eliminate discrimination.
A. Equation as a Mechanism
Equation advocates argue that equating the experiences of a unique population, women
for the purpose of this paper, to the experiences of the dominant group, helps to frame protection
disparities in terms that those in power understand. The rationale is that those who make the law
are often not the same people that experience breakdowns in the law. Subsequently, how those
breakdowns occur, and the consequences of those breakdowns need to be related to the
experiences of those creating the law, so those who created the law can become aware of the
various experiences of the people that the law will encompass.
Edwards explained that, “women’s experiences are seen as an exception to the main or
general understanding of those particular provisions. In other words, women are seen as
deviation from that standard and as an exception to the rule, rather than as equal beneficiaries of
the human rights protection system. The practical effect as men de jure is to impose additional
burdens on women de facto.”72
Conversely, there are many reasons that negate the feasibility of Edwards’ equation
approach. First, this approach disregards the fact that women experience discrimination in
qualitatively different ways than men, therefore ignoring the very reasons that these violations
occur in the first place.73 Additionally, the approach forces women to equate their experiences to

72

Edwards, supra note 68, at 5.
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what men experience which not only reinforces the sexual hierarchy that already exists in the
system, but also works to tell women that their experiences are not of valid concern unless men
also experience them.74
Finally, “the more gender-neutral or gender-blind a particular right (or any law or public
policy) is, the more likely it is to enhance the privilege of men and eclipse the needs of women as
subordinates.”75 Although commonly explained in terms of the power inequality between men
and women, these same concerns translate to inequality based on race, gender, ability,
nationality, and sexual identity. The fact that the international community have agreed to create
treaties specific to unique groups furthermore serves as conclusive evidence of the deficiencies
of the equation approach.
As opposed to multiple conventions aimed at protection the rights of distinct vulnerable
populations, international human rights law has traditionally viewed a single document, framed
in terms of ‘all people’, as sufficient to protect the rights of everyone. This point is evidenced by
the fact that the International Bill of Human Rights, consisting of the Universal Declaration of
Human Rights, the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, and the International
Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights, are collectively written in terms of “all
humans”76 or “all people”.77
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Yet, there is a shift away from the equation mechanism. The International Convention on
the Elimination of All Forms of Racial Discrimination is still framed in terms of “all people”, but
was the first international human rights law treaty to address discrimination against a specific
group.78 Subsequently, six more international human rights law treaties have been ratified and
entered into force.79 That said, of the nine-core international human rights law treaties, only five
directly address unique populations, such as women, children, persons with disabilities, and
migrant workers.80
B. Justification as a Mechanism
The second approach Edwards offers to advance women’s rights is to justify why
women’s experiences deserve the establishment of an exception to the pre-existing, ‘universal’
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rule.81 With all of the inherent challenges of the equation approach, it is a logical extension that
the justification approach is worth analysis.
There are three primary disadvantages in justifying the need to create an exception to the
general rule. First, creating an exception to the ‘general rule’ further perpetuates the myth that
women are weak and not truly equal to men; if women and men were actually equal, they
wouldn’t need a separate rule to protect them.82 Secondly, creating a separate rule
exceptionalizes the experiences of women and thereby “essentializes her”.83 Because the focus is
being placed on how men and women experience life differently, and because men’s life
experience is considered standard, women are being reduced to their differences; differences that
are traditionally seen as ‘less than’. Finally, focusing solely on the differences between men and
women runs the risk of contemplating women as monolithic, as opposed to appreciating the rich
diversity of characteristics inherent in women beyond their sex.84
Regardless of the obstacles, justifying why the unique experiences of women deserve an
exception to the rule provides many advantages. First, explaining why women deserve
exceptions to the rule brings the issues to light.85 Additionally, this method gives women a
platform not only to discuss what the problems are, but why the problems exist. Next, examining
issues in terms of unique experiences instead of equating to “normal” experiences legitimizes the
struggles of a distinctive population. Finally, it is clear that universal declarations to eliminate
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discrimination do not provide adequate protections.86 Despite the challenges of this approach,
justifying why an experience is unique and therefore is deserving of special protections is
sometimes the only way to ensure equal rights.
IV.

CEDAW

A. What is CEDAW
The Convention of the Elimination of All Forms of Discrimination Against Women
(CEDAW) was adopted by the UN General Assembly in 1979.87 As one of the most widely
ratified human rights law treaties with 189 state parties,88 CEDAW is a perfect example of the
‘justification’ prong of Edwards’ feminist paradox in practice. “The preamble of CEDAW
expressly recognizes that, despite the international obligations to put an end to discrimination
between men and women that were laid down in the previously adopted human rights treaties,
extensive discrimination against women continues to exist.”89
State parties to CEDAW are obligated to eliminate all forms of discrimination against
women by incorporating equality measures into their legal systems, eliminating discriminatory
laws that are already implemented, and taking appropriate measures to change negative cultural
stereotypes.90 The Convention defines discrimination as "...any distinction, exclusion or
restriction made on the basis of sex which has the effect or purpose of impairing or nullifying the
recognition, enjoyment or exercise by women, irrespective of their marital status, on a basis of
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equality of men and women, of human rights and fundamental freedoms in the political,
economic, social, cultural, civil or any other field."91
Even though the elimination of discrimination is the main purpose of the Convention, the
definition of discrimination used is much broader than the traditional scope of the definition. As
a point of comparison, Merriam-Webster defines discrimination as, “prejudiced or prejudicial
outlook, action, or treatment.”92 CEDAW’s definition expresses discrimination as an instance of
women’s oppression.93 “The notion of oppression goes beyond mere unequal treatment, but also
includes instances of marginalization, powerlessness, cultural imperialism, and violence.”94 This
expansive definition of discrimination recognizes the indivisibility and interdependence of the
different categories of rights and the compounding effects of having those rights go
unrecognized.95
States that have ratified CEDAW are legally bound to puts its provisions into practice and
submit national reports to the CEDAW Committee at least every four years detailing their
compliance with the treaty.96 There are three specific measures state parties are obligated to
undertake by virtue of signing onto the treaty: 1) they must incorporate the principle of equality
between men and women into the legal system which includes abolishing discriminatory laws
and adopting ones that prohibit discrimination against women, 2) where mechanisms don’t exist,
they must establish tribunals or other public institutions, or properly support existing
mechanisms to ensure the effective protections of women’s rights, and 3) they must ensure the
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elimination of discrimination against women in all forms and by perpetrated by all actors.97
Finally, states are obligated not only to ensure the elimination of discrimination in the public
sector, but also to enact laws and public policy aimed at the elimination of discrimination in
private life as well.98 In short, the protections under CEDAW have been monumental for
bringing issues of women’s rights into the central focus of the international human rights law
arena.99
B. Application of CEDAW to the LGBT Community
At first glance, it appears obvious that the protections afforded under CEDAW are
specific to women. The convention title directly refers to women: the Convention of the
Elimination of all forms of Discrimination Against Women.100 Additionally, the Convention is
colloquially called the Women’s Rights Treaty.101 However, notwithstanding the title, the
Convention is framed in terms of sex. As stated previously, CEDAW defines discrimination as
“any distinction, exclusion or restriction made on the basis of sex…”102 The facial analysis of
this conventions leads to an easy assumption that the protections of CEDAW do not and should
not extend past women. However, the use of sex and gender interchangeably within the
Convention and the similarity in discrimination experienced by both women and members of the
LGBT community are significant and serve to challenge the assertion that CEDAW only applies
to females.
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i) “Sex” v. “Gender”
Despite the stated goals of CEDAW of eliminating discrimination against women and
defining discrimination in terms of sex, CEDAW fails to define ‘sex’, ‘gender’, or ‘women’
within the body of the Convention.103 Further, a significant part of the Convention explicitly
prohibits discriminatory actions based on gender roles despite being framed in terms of sex. 104
The World Health Organization defines sex as “the biological characteristic that define humans
as female or male.”105 Gender, on the other hand, is generally understood as a concept that is
socially constructed.106 Even though the construction of the definition of gender is complex and
varies depending on culture, construction is often determined by the roles women are expected to
occupy and play, the relationship of those roles to the role of men, and the value society places
on those roles.107
Despite the growing consensus that sex and gender occupy two different definitions, the
terms ‘are rarely explicitly mentioned in the documentation of human rights treaty bodies, and if
they are referred to, they are often used interchangeably and without explanation.”108 The lack of
definition or differentiation between sex and gender within CEDAW may be a product of the
time period in which the Convention was written.109 While the 1970’s saw a drastic increase in
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the discussion of women’s rights and equality, there was still little dialog of or acceptance for
anyone that did not conform to traditional gender norms or sexual preferences.110
This lack of distinction works in favor of extending the protections of CEDAW to
members of the LGBT community. In light of contemporary views about the uses and definitions
of sex and gender, it is a viable argument that the protections afforded under CEDAW already
extend beyond the biological sex classification of ‘woman’.111 “Despite variations across cultures
and over time, gender relations throughout the world entail asymmetry of power between men
and women as a pervasive trait. Thus, gender is a social stratifier, and in this sense, it is similar
to other social stratifiers such as race, class, ethnicity, sexuality, and age.”112 Under a “living
law” model, interpreting the protections of CEDAW to extend to the modern definitions of sex
and gender is not just plausible, but necessary.113
Analogous to a woman’s experience of asymmetry of power due to her perceived
relationship to men, members of the LGBT community experience an asymmetry of power in
comparison to their cisgender, cissexual counterparts. “The Convention’s references to gender
stereotypes and to culture, taken together with the prohibition in the Convention as well as in
other documents against sex discrimination, can be utilized to expand and modernize the reach
and application of CEDAW in light of the existing interpretations expanding the meaning of
terms such as ‘sex’.”114
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ii) Similarity in Discriminatory Experiences
One aspect that makes CEDAW unique is its inclusion of articles mandating that states
implement measures to eliminate negative stereotypes as a means to eliminate discrimination
against women.115 In addition to the realization of full legal equality between men and women
and enhancing de facto equality of women, CEDAW’s main objective is to take away the
cultural and social roots of gender inequality.116 Article 5(a) and 2(f) work together to recognize
that gender stereotypes and fixed paternal roles affect women in an individual capacity but also
on the level of societal structures and institutions.117 The Convention not only demands that
States endeavor to eliminate systematic and structural discrimination against women, but also
discrimination that exists on a personal level due to social and cultural convictions.118 “Concepts
of individual autonomy, freedom, and diversity are crucial for a correct understanding of the
content and scope of article 5a and of the Convention as a whole.”119
One of the most damning stereotypes precluding women’s equal rights is that a woman’s
value is derived mainly from being a wife and a mother. “Women’s sexuality and their
reproductive capacity are crucial for the construction of gender stereotypes and fixed paternal
gender roles.”120 Rikki Holtmaat and Paul Post argue that “the most blatant transgression of the
patriarchal female gender identity and her fixed gender role is the lesbian women who chooses to
115
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renounce a male sexual partner and thereby also rejects the protection of the male head of
household, and all other forms of male supervisions on and control of her life.”121 Negative
gender stereotypes in general, and this line of reasoning specifically, demonstrate why the
protections of CEDAW can and should extend to all members of the LGBT community.
The implications of negative sexual and gender-based stereotypes do not affect females
exclusively. All people that renounce traditional heterosexual and universal feminine and
masculine gender identities and gender roles are affected as well.122 Forced marriage of those
who do not adhere to traditional heterosexual preferences, denial of rights to healthcare,
reproductive care, housing, education, and employment on the basis of sexual preference or
gender identity, and “curative” rape are all examples of the type of discrimination and violence
people of the LGBT community, as well as women, can face as a product of negative cultural
stereotypes.123 Because members of the LGBT community experience discrimination on the
basis of negative cultural stereotypes, just as women do, and because one of CEDAW’s main
objectives is to eliminate the negative cultural stereotypes that lead to discrimination, the
protections of CEDAW should apply to both groups of people equally.
V.

Options under CEDAW to Protect the LGBT Community

The question of whether the protections afforded under CEDAW facially include, can be
interpreted to include, or can be reimagined to include members of the LGBT community is not
novel. For example, Darren Rosenblum suggested unsexing CEDAW by replacing ‘women’ with
‘sex and gender’ to put it in line with many of the other international human rights law
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treaties.124 Rikki Holtmaat and Paul Post explored the possibility of changing the interpretation
of CEDAW in an effort to enhance LGBT rights.125 Finally, in a short reaction article to
Rosenblum’s proposition to unsex CEDAW, Berta E. Hernández-Truyo suggested “supersexing” the treaty by expanding the reach of the Convention to include sexuality, gender, and
gender identity by means of an optional protocol.126 This section will explain each option,
examine the benefits and pitfalls of each, and finally recommend a strategy for the protection of
the LGBT community.
A. Unsex CEDAW
Darren Rosenblum was one of the first scholar to suggest a change to the frame of
CEDAW to incorporate protections for all people.127 He suggested replacing the word “women”
within the Convention with “sex and gender”.128 He first explains the historical background and
positive effects of specifically including “women” versus “sex” or “gender” in the treaty title and
text. Rosenblum then presents numerous compelling arguments for why CEDAW should be
‘unsexed’. First, though never defined within the Conventions itself, he argues that the use of
‘women’ creates a false sense of universality among all women and therefore essentializes
them.129 Next, framing the Treaty in terms of “equality between men and women” creates a
male/female binary.130 This section will explore Rosenblum’s arguments for un-sexing CEDAW
and critically analyze their feasibility.

124

Rosenblum, supra note 13.
Holtmaat, supra note 73, at 321.
126
Hernández-Truyo, supra not 83, at 213.
127
Rosenblum, supra note 13.
128
Hernández-Truyo, supra not 83, at 219.
129
Rosenblum, supra note 13, at 128.
130
Id. at 101.
125

25

Kellie Bruney
Soon after the adoption of Universal Declaration on Human Rights (UDHR) and the
International Convention of Civil and Political Rights (ICCPR), the framers of CEDAW sought
to ensure women’s place at the proverbial international human right law table.131 The march
toward inclusion began when the Economic and Social Council of the United Nations
(ECOSOC) established the Commission on the Status of Women (CSW).132 The Declaration on
the Elimination of Discrimination against Women (DEDAW) arrived in 1967.133 DEDAW
represented a significant step forward in ensuring the recognition and consideration of women’s
rights at the international level, but the ‘soft’ nature of the document left space for a legally
binding instrument.
In 1974, the Commission on the Status of Women held discussions about the potential
text of CEDAW.134 These discussions introduced the idea of framing the Conventions in terms of
‘sex’ instead of ‘women’, but “some representatives believed that because the Commission has
been known for twenty-six years as the Commission on the Status of Women, a change would
only create confusion and that what was really important was the content of the program.”135 The
concerns of those representatives prevailed. “CEDAW reflected an historical need to focus on
women and their experiences in order to define and address the harms of sexism.136
Despite the fact that there are deeply significant historical roots for the use of ‘women’
instead of ‘sex’ or ‘gender’, the decision to use women instead of sex or gender comes with some
important consequences. Regardless of whether the Framers thought the definition of ‘women’
131
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was so obvious that it did not need defining137 or consciously choose not to define the term in
order to avoid contested language that may have hampered widespread ratification138, the failure
to define women in the Convention is consequential. The lack of definition creates a false sense
of universality of women.139 Cultural interpretations of what it means to be a woman can vary
wildly.140 For example, the availability of sex-related surgery, whether cosmetic, gender identity
related, or ritual, has broadened what it means to be a biological female.141 Beyond the
fundamental sex and gender concerns over what it means to be a woman, the use of ‘women’ in
the treaty ignores the impact of other factors such as race, nationality, and sexual orientation on
the female experience.142 All of these factors serve to hinder, rather than promote, the rights of
women.
Problematic in itself, the criticism of the use and focus on ‘women’ within the
Convention is not limited to the false sense of universality it promulgates. The focus of the
Convention on the elimination of inequality between men and women creates a gender binary.143
Departing for the more universalist approach of ‘sex’ used in the UDHR and ICCPR, CEDAW’s
use of men versus women not only asserts the existence of only two sexes, but also establishes
the desirability of equality between the two.144 This fact is especially important for the argument
of extending the protections of CEDAW to the LGBT community because reframing or
137
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reconceptualizing the Conventions in terms of sex rather than women would allow for the
inclusion of men, women, transgenders, intersex, and other differently sexed and gendered
people.145
In theory, replacing “women” with gender and sex neutral terms makes the treaty as a
whole more inclusive.146 No longer focusing on women’s inequality as compared to men, but
instead demanding equal treatment no matter what gender the person identifies with or sexual
preferences they have, opens up the protections enumerated not only to men and the LGBT
community, but also to women that do not suffer from the specific types of discrimination
explained in the treaty.147 Un-sexing CEDAW is the most conservative approach because putting
the Convention in terms of sex and gender eliminates the need to specifically reference the
LGBT community, therefore lessening the possibility of organized resistance to the treaty.148
However, due to its deep historical roots, changing the wording of the Convention is bound to be
met with resistance.149 Finally, by un-sexing CEDAW, the risk of essentializing women is
greatly reduced because they are no longer being reduced to what makes them different than
men.
Despite the positive implications of reframing the treaty, changing the entire Convention
to ‘sex’ and ‘gender’ instead of ‘women’ is unrealistic. Not without its flaws, the focus of
CEDAW on women’s rights did and has continued to give women’s rights a place at the
international human rights law table.150 The Convention has allowed not just for international
conversations about the rights of women at government and state levels, but it has also given
145
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nongovernmental organizations a platform to demonstrate on the ground inequality and demand
change.151 I agree with Rosenblum’s fundamental arguments to increase CEDAW’s scope to
‘sex’ and ‘gender’ and not just ‘women’, but disagree with the approach of redrafting the
Convention.
B. General Recommendation
The second possibility for the applicability of CEDAW to the LGBT community stems
from the Committee’s increased willingness to read the LGBT community into the protections
afforded under the Convention. Holtmaat and Post conducted a systematic analysis of the
Committees position regarding LGBT rights.152 They analyzed the language of General
Recommendations, Concluding Observations, and responses to Individual Complaints.153 The
results of this analysis suggest that the Committee may be willing to write a General
Recommendation expanding the protections of CEDAW to the LGBT community.
Within international human rights law, state parties to treaties must send reports to the
treaty committees at regular intervals detailing their compliance with the mandate of the specific
treaty. In response to these reports, the committee for the treaty body writes concluding
observations, which are specific to that country, recognizing the country’s accomplishments
during the reporting period while also suggesting areas of improvement.154 Between January 1,
2010 and December 31, 2014, the CEDAW Committee wrote one hundred and ten (110)
Concluding Observations in response to reports submitted by State parties to the treaty.155 Thirtyseven of those one hundred and ten Concluding Observations included the terms ‘gay’, ‘lesbian’,
151
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‘transgender’, ‘transsexual’, ‘LGBT’, ‘same-sex’, or ‘sexual-orientation’.156 Importantly, those
thirty seven reports spanned all continents.157 Lesbian women and transsexual or transgendered
persons were most often mentioned in connection with discussion of intersectionality or within
lists of particularly vulnerable groups in need of special protection.158 Beyond their discussion in
connection with intersectionality, the Committee also made a point to address LGBT issues
within their discussion of violence against women.159 Previous to 2010, the Committee tended to
be vague and cautious when referencing the LGBT community in Concluding Observations.160
In comparison, reference to the LGBT community within one third of the Concluding
Observations authored during the four-year study period is a drastic and necessary increase.
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Beyond simply referencing the LGBT community within the Concluding Observations,
the Committee also included recommendations for combatting discrimination against LGBT
persons. Most often, the Committee did not provide specific recommendations, but instead stated
vaguely that women should be able to live without fear of violence.161 In a still vague, but
slightly more specific recommendation, the Committee invited Singapore to put in place “a
comprehensive strategy to modify or eliminate patriarchal attitudes and stereotypes that
discriminate against women, including those based on sexual orientation and gender identity.”162
Within the 2012 Concluding Observation for Norway, the Committee called upon Norway to
take “specific measures to address difficulties faced by lesbian and transgendered asylum
seekers.”163
In a few instances, the Committee explicitly stated ways in which states could and should
protect the rights of the LGBT community. In Concluding Observations for the Russian
Federation, Uganda, South Africa, and Zimbabwe, the Committee gave the identical suggestion
for the states to ‘launch a sensitization campaign aimed at the general public, as well as
providing appropriate training to law enforcement officials.”164 Similarly, in an effort to fight
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violence based on sexual orientation and gender identity, the Committee recommended that
Panama initiate “awareness-raising programmes in school curricula, the training of teachers and
the sensitization of the media and the public at large, including actions specifically targeting men
and boys.”165 Though specific recommendations aimed at ending discrimination on the basis of
sexual orientation and gender identity are not yet normal practice for the Committee, these
examples are promising steps in the right direction.
In addition to Concluding Observations, human rights treaty bodies also promulgate
General Recommendations. Unlike Concluding Observations which are state-specific, General
Recommendations may be themed, but are general to all signatories.166 The CEDAW Committee
has made references to the LGBT community generally in General Recommendation 21 and
specifically in General Recommendations 27 and 28.167 Though only explicitly mentioned in two
Recommendations, and done so in passing, it is encouraging that the Committee has been in
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enough agreement to include any reference to the LGBT community at all. Finally, within the
context of the individual complaint mechanism, sexual orientation was only mentioned once.168
There is a divide in general consensus as to the binding nature of General
Recommendations.169 Some are of the mind that General Recommendations are the Committee’s
way of clarifying the application and interpretation of the Convention, and therefore are
binding.170 On the other side of the coin, some believe that General Recommendations are just
what their title suggests, recommendations.171 With all of this in mind, the idea of expanding the
scope of the treaty to reach the LGBT community through a specific General Recommendation
has strengths and weaknesses.
Expanding the scope of CEDAW to the LGBT community through a specific General
Recommendation does have multiple advantages. First, as noted previously, the Committee has
already begun to make general references to the LGBT community in General
Recommendations.172 The Committee has been even bolder in its assertions within Concluding
Observations.173 This demonstrates that despite consisting of experts from differing locations and
168
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backgrounds174, the Committee was able to come together and agree on the inclusion of the
LGBT community. Finally, because there are a number of states that do view General
Recommendations as binding, writing specifically to expand CEDAW to include the LGBT
community, will at least mandate that those states not only begin to include statistics of the
LGBT community within their state reports, but also take measures to eliminate discrimination
against the group.
The most impactful weakness of using a General Recommendation to expand the scope
of CEDAW centers around the validity of the binding nature of Recommendations. Those that
view General Recommendations as non-binding can choose to either incorporate the
recommendations of the Committee or simply ignore them. However, for those state parties that
view General Recommendations as binding and also don’t agree with expanding the scope of
CEDAW to include gender, sexual identity, and gender identity, the implications could be harsh.
At best, those state parties could treat that General Recommendation as non-binding, potentially
leading to the general view that all General Recommendations are non-binding on that state
party. At worst, the state could withdraw from the Convention all together, and potentially band
together with other like-minded nation states to delegitimize the process as a whole. Even though
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this option runs the risk of losing signatories to the Convention, it is the least invasive of all of
the proposals.
Though the creation of an LGBT specific General Recommendation is the least invasive,
and therefore most likely to pass, method of expanding the reach of CEDAW, it is also the
method with the least teeth. Because there is still an ongoing debate over the binding nature of
General Recommendations, I am suggesting that this method does not fully utilize the power of
one of the most widely ratified treaties and does not go far enough to protect the LGBT
community.
C. Optional Protocol to CEDAW
As discussed in the previous sections, the protection of the rights of the LGBT
community is inherent in the core human rights treaties due to their classification as humans.175
However, the fact still remains that people who identify as LGBT are suffering human rights
abuses on a daily basis.176 Even the introduction of LGBT specific United Nations resolutions
have failed to adequately protect the foundational rights of this vulnerable population. For that
reason, I believe the adoption of a second optional protocol to CEDAW comprised of the
Yogyakarta Principles is the best device to ensure the recognition and preservation of the LGBT
community while still maintaining the historic impact of the Convention.
It has become commonplace for international human rights law treaties to be followed by
the adoption of an optional protocol.177 Treaties in their own right, these protocols exist to
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facilitate the proper implementation of the goals of the underlying convention.178 As such, they
are only open for signature and ratification by member states to the original treaty.179 There are
two types of optional protocols, substantive and procedural.180 Substantive protocols are those
that address topics that were not included in the original text of the treaty.181 Procedural
protocols, on the other hand, address issues that may affect the way in which a treaty operates182,
such as the inclusion of an individual complaint procedure of Optional Protocol to CEDAW.183
Individual complaint procedures are especially useful for treaties that have seen slow realization
of the rights demanded within the body of the text, and provide for a way to elaborate on the
meaning of the treaty and expand the jurisprudence on the subject.184
A second optional protocol to CEDAW expanding the scope of the Convention to include
gender, gender identity, and sexual preference through the adoption of the Yogyakarta
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Principles, would ameliorate many of the issues identified with expanding protection through a
General Recommendation or by completely reworking the Treaty.
As we have seen previously, the CEDAW Committee has already begun addressing
LGBT rights within Concluding Observations, General Recommendations, and an individual
complaint.185 This signals the Committees willingness to extend CEDAW to include sex and
gender, even if only in a limited scope. Since the Yogyakarta Principles already parallel many of
the same rights and protections included within CEDAW such as: “equality and nondiscrimination, personhood, like, security, privacy, trafficking, work, education, housing, health,
family, and culture”,186 their inclusion into an option protocol would be seamless.
As opposed to outright changing the wording of the Treaty as proposed by Rosenblum,
creating an Optional Protocol permits the positive women-centric outcomes of the Convention to
continue while allowing state parties the opportunity to choose to extend the Convention’s reach
to other similarly situated populations. Additionally, all of the symbolic and historic reasons for
naming the Convention in terms of women to begin with will likely derail future attempts to
change its name.187 Further, due to the legally binding nature of optional protocols, this method
would put more teeth behind the protections for the LGBT community than a General
Recommendation could. All of these factors combine to further bolster the conclusion that the
adoption of a second optional protocol to CEDAW is the best option for extending much needed
protections to the LGBT community.
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D. Conclusion
Despite growing international consensus that members of the LGBT community deserve
recognition and protection, there is still not a binding legal mechanism specific to the
community.188 As has been explored throughout this paper, the universal rights established in the
Universal Declaration of Human Rights, the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights
and the International Covenant on Economic, Social and Culture Rights do in theory provide
protections to the LGBT community.189 However, violence and discrimination based on sexual
orientation and gender identity is still rampant.190
At first glance, the Convention on the Elimination of all forms of Discrimination Against
Women (CEDAW) is not entirely applicable for protecting the LGBT community. However,
changes in the interpretation of ‘sex’, the similar discrimination faced by both women and
members of the LGBT community, and the CEDAW Committee’s willingness to inch closer to
extending protections, begs the question: why not extend CEDAW to protect the LGBT
community?
Broadening the interpretation of the Convention to include sexual orientation and gender
identity within its protection by way of General Recommendation and complete redrafting of the
Convention have been suggested.191 However, each of those options are accompanied by
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consequences that far outweigh their worth. Instead, I have suggested the adoption of a second
Optional Protocol to CEDAW incorporating the Yogyakarta Principles as a means of expanding
the scope of the Convention to include members of the LGBT community. This option utilizes
the most compelling arguments from promulgating a Concluding Observation and completely
reworking the Convention to substitute ‘women’ for ‘sex and gender’ while side stepping many
of the obstacles. Though the international community has made incredible strides in recognizing
and accepting those who do not conform to traditional notions of gender or sexual preference, the
continued human rights violations perpetrated against this population makes is clear that a more
definite step is necessary.
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